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The abject and the vulnerable: the twain shall meet: Reflections on disability in 
the moral economy 
Bill Hughes 
Introduction 
The meaning of impairment is often Janus-faced.  On the one hand, it is associated 
with defect, deformity, monstrosity and other tropes that carry the weight of 
ontological ruin, haunting narratives of physical, mental or sensory catastrophe that 
disturb the normate sense of being human (Hughes 2009). Impairment is invested 
with the debilitating social and moral consequences that symbolise disability. 
Disavowed and repudiated by the non-disabled community, disability represents the, 
murky, shadow side of existence that separates normal embodiment from its’ 
benighted, abject ‘other’ (Shakespeare 1994). Disgust – on the part of non-disabled, 
‘clean and proper’ subjects - is the likely emotional response to the pollution and 
impropriety that disability represents. The emotional relation between the two parties, 
is, mired in normate repulsion.  
On the other hand, impairment is interpreted by non-disabled people as a ‘personal 
tragedy’ (Oliver 1990). The ‘misfortune’ of impairment is conceived as spoilt identity 
by the physical or intellectual narratives of vulnerability to which it is reduced. 
Compassion, sympathy, perhaps empathy but mostly pity, follow the suffering and 
pain that are assumed to dominate the lives of disabled people. Disabled people, 
according to the dominant narrative, embody wounds that will not heal; live lives 
determined by frailty and dependency and must appeal to the magnanimity and 
charitable instincts of ‘sovereign’ bodies to sustain their blighted existence.  
In this paper, I argue that the double branding of disability representation as abject 
and vulnerable is central to the ontological and moral invalidation of disabled people, 
making disability central to the ‘moral economy’ in a variety of cultural contexts. 
When interpreted and represented as abject and monstrous, disability is good to 
mistreat. When interpreted as vulnerable and needy, disability is good to be good to. 
While these ableist approaches to impairment can be separated analytically, in 
practice they tend to form a de-moralising confluence of disabling processes. 
Ableism valorises invulnerability and the ‘clean and proper body’. It does so, not only 
by propagating phantasies of human betterment and perfection but by expropriating 
the agency and dignity of disabled people. However, it is important to note that the 
twain can meet. Vulnerability can collapse into abjection, impairment into pollution. 
Moral Economy 
The concept of ‘moral economy’ was coined by the Marxist historian E.P. Thompson 
(1966; 1971). He used it as an analytical framework for understanding protest. His 
focus was the ‘the moral economy of the poor’ and the ethics of subsistence that 
arise amongst oppressed peoples in the course of class struggle to identify injustice 
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and vindicate resistance, rebellion and riot. Karl Polanyi (1944/2002) used the idea – 
though not the phrase - to argue that the market economy is embedded in social and 
moral practices that ameliorate its tendency towards profiteering and exploitation. 
The concept is widely used in a variety of fractured ways in a number of fields of 
study (Booth 2013). It has attracted a good deal of attention, recently in moral and 
economic sociology (Bolton and Laasar 2013; Sayer 2000; 2005; 2006; 2007; 
20011) and draws upon debates about ‘moral regulation’ (Corrigan 1981; Dean 
1994; Hier 2002; Hunt 1999) that inspired Marxist and Foucauldian scholars, 
particularly in the latter part of the last millennium.    
The idea has widened considerably from its analytical base as a reflex of or 
reflection on the socio-ethical ramifications of the market. Moral economy can now 
be understood as the ‘site’ of ‘lay normativity’ (Sayer 2011: 5), the mundane spaces 
in which concern for and evaluation of others is developed and mobilised; This is an 
expansive ‘site’: As Hunt (1999: 8) argues: ‘There is no “moral field”, no place where 
“the moral” rules alone, or even predominates; morality is to be found everywhere’. 
The moral economy is trenchant in the relations that constitute everyday life and the 
judgements about others that shape its activities: 
Because of our psychological and physical vulnerability, our dependence on 
others and our capacity for diverse actions, and because of contingency, we are 
necessarily evaluative beings, continually having to monitor and evaluate how we 
and the things we care about are faring, and to decide what to do. Some of this 
evaluation is done “on automatic” through our “feel for the game”, but some 
involves reflection or “internal conversations” (Sayer 2011: 5) 
Morality - the evaluations that give it shape - impinges profoundly on the relations 
between disabled and non-disabled people. These relations are formed by the 
hegemony of the normate over the normative; constituting a culture of oppression in 
which disability is represented in negative ways (Young 1990). Moral economy - 
close companion to the material injustices that spring from political economy - is the 
space in which cultural or symbolic injustice thrives. Nancy Fraser (1997: 14) argues 
that cultural or symbolic injustice is ‘rooted in social practices of representation, 
interpretation and communication’ and that ‘examples include … cultural domination 
… non-recognition and disrespect’. Fraser may not use the term moral economy per 
se but her (analytical) distinction between, on the one hand, the social politics of 
(in)equality and material injustice and, on the other hand, the cultural politics of 
difference and the symbolic injustice of culture suggest a realm of cultural valuations 
in which economically marginalised groups are deprecated and demeaned. The 
latter is a symbolic pawn shop where ‘goods’ of diminished value wait to be retrieved 
or decommissioned. If political economy is the realm of economic disadvantage, 
moral economy is the realm of cultural injustice, the space in which disability is 
disrespectfully constructed and subordinated to the ableist narratives of propriety 
and invulnerability. The normate habitus of worth and virtue attenuates the moral 
status of disability reducing it to an instrument – a very significant one – in the social 
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distribution and exchange of embodied value. Disability is positioned, in normate 
culture, as the antithesis of embodied value in terms of both ‘its’ diminished agency 
and ‘its’ polluting embodiment. As such, ‘it’ is both good to be good to and good to 
mistreat. Non-disability is, by contrast, ontologically pristine and self-sufficient. It is 
the touchstone of propriety and cleanliness and the wellspring of agency, the 
legitimate source of dignity and moral action.  
The ableist moral economy is manifest in the dominant imaginary; in the cognitive 
and emotional space in which the concrete evaluations of persons and things are 
collectively and subjectively constructed and reconstructed. It is in this doxic and - for 
disabled people - toxic collective psyche that the taken for granted values 
underpining everyday life are stored, sorted and mobilised and, so, come to matter in 
mundane, sensate conduct. The dual representation of disability as polluting and 
vulnerable, situates disability at the heart of ‘moral economy’; central to the 
production, distribution and exchange of moral sentiment. An ‘affective economy’ 
accompanies it. The principle emotional dispositions in the ‘affective economy’ that 
partner, abjection and vulnerability are disgust and pity. Other variants of these core 
emotions such as hatred, fear and compassion are also embroiled in the mixed 
economy of affects where felt relations of power and value between normality and 
difference are produced and executed.  
‘Disgust’ writes Miller (1997: 200) ‘marks out moral matters from which we can have 
no compromise’ placing us ’truly in the grip of the norm whose violation we are 
witnessing or imagining’. To feel disgust is to make ‘a judgement that an act’ or a 
person ‘has fallen beneath a standard or has ignored an accepted norm’ (Wilson 
2002: 51). Pity moves us to consider a hierarchal distribution of good fortune, in 
which ‘we’ – the unblemished - count our blessings as we consider the tragic 
indignities that have befallen the broken and the crooked while ‘we’ – qua the 
unpolluted subject - continue to prosper and thrive. Pity too involves a judgement 
about the life of the other: the assumption that it is mired in tragic deficit (Oliver 
1990). Pity breeds opportunity to do good. Disgust creates opportunities for 
discrimination, exclusion and ‘legitimate’ violence.  
These economies – moral and affective - are the mainspring of ableist social 
relations and through them it becomes possible to legitimate moral action in which 
disability is simultaneously good to mistreat and good to be good to. It is in and 
through this bifurcated and contradictory moral economy of abjection and 
vulnerability that the ablesit doxa of disability invalidation is performed. 
Table 1: Dimensions of disability invalidation in the ableist moral economy 
 Ontological Level Vulnerable Abject 
Embodied Representation Wounded (Vulneratus) Monstrous (Monstrosus)* 
Emotional response Pity Disgust 
Social response Charity Exclusion 
Psychological response Disavowal Dehumanisation 
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Moral response Good to be good to Good to mistreat 
 
Table 1 maps out the Janus-faced nature of disability representation and the 
responses to it across a range of socio-ontological levels but it is always possible, in 
the march of time, for vulnerability to collapse into abjection; for ‘weakness’, to 
become a pollutant; pity to become disgust, charity to be subsumed into violence 
and disavowal into dehumanisation. This is particularly the case in a moral economy 
where eugenic sentiments are strong. 
Vulnerability 
 ‘[I]n western modernity … vulnerability is figured as a shortcoming, an impending 
failure both of form and of function; a predicate that marks its subject as potentially 
beyond normative standards of being … Those who too readily admit or who 
succumb to vulnerability are either weak or unfortunate’ (Shildrick 2002: 71-2) 
Vulnerability underpins companionship and compassion. The wound (vulnus) brings 
us face to face with our common humanity, our mortality. In suffering, self and other 
discover their mutual fate and from this encounter with the shadow of death the basis 
of community is formed. In Homer’s Iliad the contrast between men and gods, 
vulnerable and invulnerable is a contrast between mortality and immortality. When 
gods – like Ares and Aphrodite - quibbling over events in terrestrial Troy are injured 
by fellow Olympians, there is no sympathy or compassion for the misfortunes of their 
peers. Why would there be? These wounds are hiccups in the play of eternity, not 
portents of ultimate doom. In the context of immortality, fellow feeling is beyond 
comprehension. The mortals fighting below are stung into compassion as comrades, 
fall in battle. The pain is shared. Homer goes to great lengths to describe the 
network of despair and suffering that follows the loss of the smitten hero. Celebration 
of the wounded is, however, muted by the tyranny of perfection that haunts classical 
culture. Impairment is an aesthetic abomination that pollutes embodied propriety. 
Congenital deformity is exposed, eliminated or ridiculed. The wounded warrior is 
better off dead (Garland 2010). Vulnerability and weakness are despised. 
Impairment has no ‘use value’. The aristocratic ‘master morality’ of Hellenic culture, 
eugenic to the core, invokes neither pity not charity for those that breach the ideals 
of embodied virtue (arete). The violent disposal of vulnerability is the standard 
response to impairment. Vulnerability – in classical culture - is abjection. It is not until 
the Christian middle-ages that disability becomes both good to be good to and good 
to mistreat. In this cultural context, disability becomes an instrument of redemption 
and a symbol of sinfulness attracting, simultaneously, charitable and violent 
responses; a dual contradictory form of moral representation that runs a rutted 
course into modernity, where secular notions of vulnerability begin to blossom.   
For example, for Darwin, in The Descent of Man, the vulnerability of the helpless 
child is the wellspring of the ‘instinct’ of sympathy. Those we characterise as good to 
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be good to are products of the recognition of vulnerability in others. The vision of the 
‘good society’ – for some enlightenment thinkers - rested on the elementary form of 
association inspired by the humanising drama of the wound. Adam Smith’s (1723-
1729) discovery of the epic productivity embodied in the division of labour is worked 
up into a vision of modern morality in which vulnerability is central. Smith 
(1776/2008) describes a ‘system of perfect liberty’ in which the egoistic pursuit of 
gain by individuals combined with the hidden hand of the market makes for an 
historical explosion of wealth. Yet Smith was both a political economis and a moral 
philosopher who argued in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759/2002) that ‘man’s’ 
ability to make ‘moral judgements’ comes by way of his innate ‘ability’ to recognise 
suffering in others. He is stoic in his rejection of Hobbesian egoism. ‘Men’ are not 
‘wild beasts’. Humankind ‘is marked by a basic harmony of interests’ (Force 2003). 
Smith takes the view that ‘man’ is a social being, endowed with feelings of 
benevolence towards fellows. It is, Smith argues, the desire for approbation that 
brings sympathy and pity for the less fortunate to the moral centre of human activity; 
creating and sustaining a natural fellowship amongst members of the human race:  
How selfish so ever man may be supposed there are evidently some principles in 
his nature which interest him in the fortunes of others and render their happiness 
necessary to him. Of this kind of pity or compassion, the emotion we feel for the 
misery of others, when we either see it or are made to conceive it in a very lively 
manner (Smith 1979/2002: 86) 
Smith understands that the entrepreneur, the recently historically formed, self-
interested, individual, needs economic gratification and the balm of benevolence as 
two sides of the same coin. Grasping palms and give-away alms go hand in hand 
and the ‘impartial spectator’ – no longer God in Heaven – is the conscience of the 
accountant that sits, a little puffed up, at the cloudy centre of philanthropic capitalism. 
Smith’s psychology comes to a place of striking tension in which it is difficult to 
disentangle rational calculation from the spirit of benevolence. It captures the aporia 
of fledgling modernity, when the newly formed individual must negotiate the 
relationship between self and other as a lonely existential priority; finding, in the 
process, that buying off misfortune with the coin of pity is a sure way to disavow 
disability and secure an identity untroubled by human vulnerability.  
Liberal humanitarianism and compassion in its modern form emerges theoretically in 
the Scottish enlightenment and sits historically between the medieval system of 
caritas and the secular systems of state welfare that emerged in the 20th century. It 
remains embedded in contemporary movements of, for example, human rights and 
the protection of people from war and atrocity. Bryan Turner (1993; 2006) argues 
that our common human frailties and limitations are the most legitimate means to 
validate a theory of universal human rights. We are all part of a community of 
suffering by virtue of our common ontological vulnerability. Self and other see - as if 




‘Compassion involves an active moral demand to address others’ suffering. 
Directed towards those outside the scope of personal knowledge, it becomes 
public compassion, shaping moral obligations to strangers in the arenas of civil 
society and liberal democracy, A sociological study of compassion clarifies the 
historical processes through which compassion at other’s suffering shapes the 
definition of ‘social problems’ and investigates the means by which specialists in 
organising moral sentiments strive to alleviate the sufferings of others’ (Sznaider 
1988: 117)  
By mid-modernity compassion is organised into ‘humanitarianism’. Sznaider 
(1988:119-20) argues that humanitarianism developed alongside democracy and the 
market in the burgeoning space of civil society that developed in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. It focused on the amelioration of pain and suffering and on the 
cruel destinies of the less fortunate. It was the ideological glue at the heart of moral 
crusades against ‘slavery, cruelty to prisoners, animals and children’ and it organised 
campaigns for ‘factory, sanitary and prison reforms’ (Ibid).  
Vulnerability, is transformed by social reformers into ameliorative strategies for social 
and moral problems. Impairment groups – like ‘idiots’ and ‘cripples’ and deaf, dumb 
and blind people – are either subsumed into the debates about eugenics and 
degeneracy or cradled by the humanitarians and reformers as among those that one 
should be good to be good to. In the moral economy of modern societies there is an 
ironic virtuous circle in which those made vulnerable by capitalism become the 
beneficiaries of its benevolence. Disability is, in this respect, an important marker of 
the intention to do good and to systematise compassion (Borsay 2005). In modern 
policy terms, where labour power becomes the measure of person’s use value, 
compassion translates into segregation and confinement. In the general pattern of 
the institutionalisation of vulnerability in ‘western democracies’, we find the disabled 
‘individual’, singled out as exemplary.  As Gibson (2006: 189) argues; ‘the binary 
division between independence / dependence has its roots in the sovereign, 
autonomous self, contained within a physical body’ where each is ‘individuated’ and 
able to ‘stand’ alone. Those who fail the test of autonomy – the prerequisite of 
economic survival – are epitomised as the vulnerable; the tragic human flotsam who 
come to depend on the contingent, voluntary bounties of sympathetic wealth. 
In the ‘system of perfect liberty’, pity is the moral sentiment that joins homo 
economicus to the community of which ‘she’ is part. Humanity preens itself in 
recognition of the joy or tragedy of other’s lives. For those designated ‘tragic’, there 
are the pitfalls of pity to endure. It convenes the economy of affects and governs, 
with hierarchical paternalism, the emotional relations between the normate 
community and vulnerable disability. Despite laudable origins in human compassion, 
it can be a cruel master. Disability as object of pity, is assumed – by non-disabled 
people – to be a negative, problematic identity. Oliver (1990) argues that non-
disabled people see ‘disabled lives’ as profoundly depleted by ‘personal tragedy’. 
Pity creates a hierarchy of fortune and favour – a basis for social inequality and for 
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the contempt that – as Rousseau suggested – lies at its dark heart. Pity diminishes 
the other just as it sustains the self’s sense of ontological security; its inflated sense 
of intellectual and corporeal completion. Pity creates charitable ‘targets’, 
representing them as troubled, sick, abnormal, dependent. It equates disability with 
‘suffering’; non-disability with its amelioration. Pity underwrites charity but obscures 
the case for disability rights. For Rousseau, the corruption of the real world - amour 
propre - transforms mankind’s natural sympathy for others into a source of 
contemptuousness, prompted by an underlying instrumentalism that twists 
benevolence into a show; a sham decency and makes those who appear to be good 
to be good to into victims of auto-gratification. The social correlate of pity is charity. It 
too is skewed by ‘the fragility of goodness’ by contingency playing tricks with ethics 
(Nussbaum 1986). 
Douglas (2000: ix) argues: ‘Though we laud charity as a Christian virtue, we know 
that it wounds’. Longmore contends that (1997: 14), ‘although they ostensibly seek 
the physical repair of those socially invalidated by disability’ televised charitable 
bashes are, in-essence, ‘rituals of moral restoration for nondisabled communicants’. 
The telethon is a spectacle that seeks to ‘effect the spiritual redemption, moral 
restoration and social elevation’ (Longmore 2016: 59) of non-disabled people. For 
Douglas charity injures the recipient and for Longmore, it provides moral advantage 
to the donor. Reinhold Niebuhr (1932; 25) articulated both views: ‘The powerful are 
more inclined to be generous than to grant social justice’; thus, philanthropy freezes 
when power is challenged or the gift accepted without appropriate humility. Charity 
sustains the distinction between ‘the vulnerable’ and ‘the invulnerable’. It confers 
moral agency on the former while as it snatches it from the later. Pity and charity rest 
on the psychological foundation of ‘disavowal’. Those who see themselves as 
persons in possession of ability, talent, self-reliance and fortitude throw a blanket of 
suffering over tragic lives; weaving strangers from the fabric of their own 
estrangement. Ableism is the force of imagination that sustains this moral divide.  
The worm may turn 
In classical society vulnerability was regarded as incompatible with virtue (arete). 
Human deformity could not be reconciled with eudaimon, with a flourishing life or a 
curriculum of excellence. Everyday evaluations of human worth were driven by 
‘physiognomic consciousness’ (Evans 1969); the ‘soul’ judged on the basis of 
appearance. Weakness is unconscionable. As a sign of corruption and a source of 
pollution, it is greeted with contempt and revulsion, ridicule and exile. It is repugnant 
stigma; consigned to the margins. 
Marginalisation, stigmatisation and maltreatment are the bread and butter responses 
to both vulnerability and abjection but vulnerability may occasion a measure of 
assimilation, albeit for reasons largely extrinsic to the needs of disabled people. The 
moral dynamic of the middle-ages combined violence and charity in its treatment of 
disabled people. The compassion associated with charity or caritas is morally 
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blunted by the wider context in which powerful and privileged givers of alms, benefit, 
by their apparent benevolence, through the theological principle by which they 
acquire spiritual advantage in their bid to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. In the 
paradox of self-serving altruism, disability (and poverty), become instruments in the 
salvation of rank and wealth. In this system of indulgences, of barter for spiritual 
gain, compassion withers on the vine of celestial profit. The coin of compassion is a 
sound investment in salvation for those who can afford it. Money in exchange for 
redemption lies at the heart of the moral economy of medieval ableism. Disability 
mediates this system of spiritual tax relief for wealthy normates. 
In the middle-ages, the scourge of sin also figures significantly in the dynamic of 
moral exchange. It is the blight of Christian lives and disability is recognised as a 
clear manifestation of its malignant presence. Disabled people were ‘shunned by all 
who did not wish to be defiled or corrupted, or who had any regard for the safety of 
their own body or soul’ (Winzer 1997: 85). As a potential contaminant of both soma 
and spirit and as a signifier of the monstrous and the demonic, disability, was a 
hallmark of the abject; an object of profane revulsion and of ‘pious’ disgust. Disabled 
people are trapped in a social landscape, permeated by a profound moral and 
emotional contradiction; a historical confluence in which pity and disgust meet and 
mix; a moral economy in which they are simultaneously good to be good to and good 
to mistreat.  
Vulnerability, in modernity, represents the deserving unfortunate as a social problem. 
Mobilising vulnerability as a representation of disability in the United Kingdom, has 
been a feature of social policy under New Labour and subsequent Conservative led 
governments. This agenda has been important in shaping the moral economy. Kate 
Brown (2012: 41) argues that; ‘singling out “the vulnerable” for special care and 
attention is linked to a moralising agenda in social policy, helping to create and 
sustain binary oppositions about the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’’. Vulnerability is a 
code that shapes argument about the parameters of social responsibility and the 
limits of welfare provision. Those who require – by administrative definition - to be 
protected or ‘safeguarded’ (Association of Directors of Social Services 2012) are 
designated as the vulnerati. To qualify for ‘special’ attention, for the community gift of 
help, in neoliberal society, one must be in a serious or critical condition and be able 
to demonstrate wounds that are gaping (Goodin 1985) if not suppurating. The criteria 
of access to ‘hospitality’ have become incrementally but systematically more 
restrictive. The ‘hospital’ is a battlefield tent as ‘the deserving’ have been reduced in 
number and the magnanimity of the wider social body has contracted. It has become 
more difficult to qualify as one to whom the community feels obliged to be good to. If 
the ranks of the vulnerable are shrinking, those who are still so defined require 
protection. Yet the protection afforded to vulnerable persons is a double-edged 
sword. Vulnerability assumes a space close to the gutter. Recent empirical evidence 
supports this contention. 
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For example, Roulstone et al (2011) uncovered a contradiction in the Criminal 
Justice System in the UK. Disabled people, positioned in a discourse of vulnerability, 
increasingly ‘victimised’ by hate crime are disadvantaged by the perception that 
violence against them is a product of their weakness rather than the villainy of their 
attackers (Burghardt 2013: 562). In other words, susceptibility to harm associated 
with being ‘vulnerable’ undermines a robust response to hate crime. The epithet of 
‘blame the victim’ applies. If those at risk of moral harm are harmed, perpetrators do 
so as if compelled by the logic of the relation manifest in their possession of agency 
as it contrasts with the inevitable docility of the victim.  
The tension between disability as good to mistreat and good to be good to is evident 
in this convoluted logic. It points beyond these bifurcated moralities suggesting that 
the positivity implicit in being good to be good to is relative to the place of disability in 
the grander scheme of things. To be good to be good to does not necessarily mean 
that one will be on the receiving end of benefits or, if one is, that these benefits might 
come at a price. In the interface between representation as abject and vulnerable, 
one’s situation as an ‘object of sympathy’ can be significantly refracted. The charity, 
help, care, support, etc., that follows vulnerability tends to position its recipients on 
the moral and material margins; that social space where the repulsion attributed to 
stigma and disreputable identity (Goffman 1963) is most likely to fester.  
The question as to why vulnerability may pass into abjection and why pity might be 
displaced by disgust is addressed in (another) recent discussion of hate crime. In 
pondering the dearth of high status, widely publicised hate crimes against disabled 
people, Thornycroft and Asquith (2017) suggest that, in dominating representation of 
the hate crime victim, abjection dissolves interest and sympathy. A hate crime 
‘figurehead’ like Stephen Lawrence has become a signifier of the struggle for justice, 
racial equality and human rights. There is no disability equivalent because abjection 
leaves nothing to valorise. The non-disabled imaginary cannot endure the affront to 
propriety that impairment represents to the ‘clean and proper’, autonomous liberal 
subject. Vulnerability, therefore, can be – even in a system where social protection is 
valued - a primary site of abjection; of the abandonment of the wounded who disturb 
‘identity, system, order’ and signify ‘the in-between, the ambiguous, the composite 
(Kristeva 1982: 4). The compassion and sympathy that underlies human community 
and collective life is fragile – the more so in tough economic times. Competing 
moralities come together at the fertile confluence of pity and disgust: Whether to flee 
the corporeal mess that the other has become (for you) or to embrace the common 
humanity that springs to life in the shadow of fellow suffering – that is the question to 
which the answer is frequently hedged. 
Abjection 
Introductions to the concept of abjection usually begin, rightly, with a discussion of 
Kristeva’s Powers of Horror (1982), in which the many complex strands of the idea 
are developed: ‘[B]eing abject is the condition of having been discarded, like 
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excrement or a corpse, feeling this like venom in the veins, yet still clinging to a 
sense of personal identity’ (Wilson 2002: xxi). The body as a site of ‘taboo’ and 
‘threatening otherness’ (Kristeva1982: 17), is the central theme. A border between 
propriety and repulsion is placed at the heart of social relations. The former carries 
the weight of purity and the latter the threat of contamination and its emotional 
counterpart, disgust. Mary Douglas (1966) described ‘dirt’ as ‘matter out of place’. 
Sartre described le visqueux – viscous or slimy - as a state of being neither solid nor 
liquid which, as an anomaly, is a source of fear and disgust. The abject evokes the 
‘dirt’ and ‘slime’ of the body; its visceral, oozy, sludgy, excremental, taboo elements; 
it’s mutability; it’s mortality; it’s journey towards putrefaction and dust. The abject is 
the dark not-so-secret-secret of the ‘clean and proper body’ of ableism. The ‘clean 
and proper body’ is, therefore, in its various historical incarnations, the tribunal of 
good self and citizen, the calling card of decency, the book seemingly judged 
appropriately by its bright, shiny, cover: ‘Being abject is the condition of having been 
discarded, like excrement or a corpse, feeling this like venom in the veins, yet still 
clinging to a sense of personal identity’ (Wilson 2002: xxi). 
The ‘clean and proper body’ is right at the heart of the ‘civilising process’ (Elias 2000) 
in which bodily and emotional comportment are fashioned by cultural constraint into 
the kinds of seemly conduct that distinguish the moral self from its degenerate and 
dissolute counterpart. Power rests in pose and poise as well as in material 
wherewithal. The good can be seen in the posture and proprioception practiced by 
the ‘clean and proper body’ just as the opposite is manifest in its abject other. 
The concept of disgust has been mobilised frequently in disability studies in recent 
years to characterise non-disabled perceptions of disability (Hughes 2009; 2012; 
2012b; Schweik 2009: 94-97; Soldatic and Pini 2009; Soldatic and Meekosha 2012). 
So too has the concept of the ‘clean and proper body’ which has been most 
thoroughly developed in disability studies by Margrit Shildrick (2002) in chapter 3 of 
her book ‘Embodying the Monster’. She draws together the vulnerable and the abject 
as mutually reinforcing axis in the construction of monstrosity and maps-out how this 
combination constructs moral relations: ‘the existence of monstrosity may serve to 
define by comparison and opposition the delimited corporeality and secure 
subjectivity of the majority, but what is important is the realisation that the standard is 
not normal but normative’ (Shildrick 2002: 50).  
In Western culture the normative pseudo-science of physiognomy has played an 
important role in the moral evaluation of disabled people. Virtue not only includes 
‘good behaviour’, but also bodily and intellectual attributes like reason, beauty and 
physical strength. Indeed, the corporeal surface is regarded as a signpost to psyche 
and soul. Classical scholar Elizabeth Evans (1969) argues that Greek culture is 
steeped in ‘physiognomic consciousness’, so much so that everyday social relations 
are marked by a system of moral evaluation that stems from it. Beauty is good. 
Credibility and worth are manifest in appearance. Abjection was, therefore, deeply 
culturally embedded not only in moral meta-narratives but in ‘lay normativity’. The 
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implications for disabled people are profound. One scholar argues that in ancient 
Greece physically disability is ‘automatically assumed’ to indicate degeneracy and 
corruption (Hartsock 2008: 40). To be happy and to flourish is dependent on physical 
and mental prowess. The celebration of ability in the virtue of the eudaimon, creates 
a very narrow doxa of being and becoming in which impairment is given no 
opportunity to participate. The polity disowns it. It is written off as disposable; to be 
made into a scapegoat (pharmakos) and expelled – vomited – from the community, 
preferably, eliminated at birth.  
Berzins McCoy (2013) argues that for the ‘wounded hero’ in the ancient world, 
vulnerability is a source of virtue. This might be the case if the wounded hero could 
still contribute to the military effort (Edwards 1997: 38). However, this claim confuses 
the moral economy of the Illiad with the quotidian moral economy of ancient Greek 
culture in which social worth and physical beauty are thoroughly imbricated and the 
derision of disabled people a common occurrence. ‘Veterans’ Garland (2010: 78) 
argues ‘may well have been as ready a target of derision as any other category of 
the disabled’. Distinguished military service may have provided little protection from 
disgust, ridicule and abuse. The dead hero who went down to a glorious death in the 
heat of battle is infinitely preferable, in his celebrated absence, to his wounded 
counterpart whose scarred presence is an affront to aesthetic propriety. Even in a 
warrior culture, the wound is a blow to both body and honour. Holmes (2007) argues 
that loss of blood is loss of ‘vital energy’. It reduces the warrior to a liminal figure. As 
the wound heals, the flow of blood is replaced by impairment, suppuration by scar 
tissue. Abjection displaces vulnerability. ‘Physiognomic consciousness’ redefines the 
‘wounded hero’. In post conflict society, heroism is reframed by abject vulnerability. 
The warrior limps out of virtue and onto the margins. In this space where one’s 
relationship to the norm is eroded, where autonomy declines, where stigma is 
embellished and sympathy turns to disgust, vulnerability and abjection are ubiquitous 
companions.  
The abject, in modernity, is fashioned on the moral high-ground of ableism; 
especially where it meets racism and misogyny. This is a long process. The 
development of practices of courtly conduct and aristocratic poise begin in the late 
middle ages. The gentrification of manners and behaviour distinguish between 
valued and invalid forms of bodily comportment and their associated affects and the 
deployment of disgust as the motor force of social and self-control. The processes 
that constitute the historical fashioning and re-fashioning of a doxic habitus of 
propriety and seemly conduct – from the middle-ages through to modernity - create 
social distance between non-disability and impairment (Hughes 2012). As manners 
become more refined, disability becomes more socially marginal and more 
emotionally repulsive. The pedestal and the gutter; the ‘clean and proper body’ and 
its polluting other interweave in a combustible relational dynamic. 
The construction and representation of disabled people as vulnerable and in need 
carries with it a counterweight of contamination and impurity in which disabled 
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people are regarded as dangerous, a threat to the virtues associated with normative 
embodiment and social order (Shildrick 2009). The propriety of both individual and 
social bodies is challenged by the presence of potentially contaminating impairment 
in the midst of community. Vulnerability is an opportunity for normate redemptive 
agency but it is also regarded as a threat to the constitutional integrity of persons 
and polity. As Burghardt (2013: 558) notes, ‘the interplay between psychic, emotive 
and categorical understandings of both vulnerability and threat has recurring 
repercussions in the lives of people with disabilities as it contributes to the ongoing 
confusion and anxiety regarding the place of disability in modern culture’. 
Compassion for the wounded and repulsion in the presence of the wound are often 
co-located. 
People traumatised by war or by acquired impairment – both ubiquitous in industrial 
society - much like its congenital sibling, are not conceived as ‘clean and proper’. 
War and work may have origins in social duty and the latter may be lionised in rituals 
of remembrance but its casualties still transgress the ableist habitus of cleanliness 
and propriety and, in this condition, are open to the aversive affects that transgress 
human sympathy. The fellowship of pity and disgust, of virtue and aversion in a 
practical economy of affects are alluded to with regularity in modern philosophy and 
literature. Hume (1788/2016: 562) caught the flavour of contradiction when he 
argued that the ‘sentiment of pity is nearly allied to contempt which is a species of 
dislike’. Blake, in the First Book of Urizen, exclaims that: ‘In anguish … pity divides 
the soul’. For Nietzsche pity is a sign of weakness and a disavowal of the will to 
power. Our relationship to others involves internal warfare; the struggle between 
repulsion and attraction; a psychic tension between desire for fellowship and the 
repudiation of the other. Mary Shelley’s eponymous monster finds himself trapped 
between pity and disgust ‘God in pity made man beautiful and alluring, after his own 
image, but my form is a filthy type of yours, more horrid even from the very 
resemblance’ (15.8). Tolkien’s character Smeagol, who appears in both the Hobbit 
and Lord of the Rings, is a case study of a figure that invokes a swithering, unstable 
combination of pity and disgust in the uneasy and fractious relationships in which he 
becomes entangled. The potential for aversion to smother compassion in disability 
history can be evidenced by a significant range of examples, including the tension 
between eugenics and philanthropy in the nineteenth century (Snyder and Mitchell 
2005) and the contradiction around notions of the ‘deservingness’ of disabled people 
that plagued normate conceptions of disability in early modernity and have 
resurfaced under neoliberal hegemony (Hughes 2015). Resentiment amongst the 
moral majority can transform sympathy into revulsion; magnanimity into 
maltreatment where ‘the weak’ are sacrificed on alters of social crisis or austerity. 
One puts social distance between the object of disgust and oneself. A spatial gap 
ensures normate safety by disposing of the threat represented by the 
contaminant/stranger. The social response to disability as an object of disgust is 
primarily one of a) symbolic violence; which may mean exclusion, segregation, 
13 
 
marginalisation, stigmatisation or b) Elimination; infanticide for disabled infants 
(Antiquity): The gas chamber (Modernity). The social response is anthropoemic – or 
bulimic; suggesting the evacuation, exile or annihilation of the impurity that 
contaminants/strangers are/represent. Disgust in relation to the ‘contaminating other’ 
legitimates violent forms of agency in-order-to purify the social body and rid it of its 
‘revolting subjects’ (Tyler 2013). 
Abjection opens-up the moral order to the legitimation of violence against persons on 
the grounds of their repulsiveness (or as Durkheim might have it – their threat to 
social order): People categorised as monsters, scum, demons, animals, idiots, 
imbeciles, degenerates, sinners, lunatics, useless eaters … etc. represent ‘matter 
out of place’ or ‘dirt’. These ‘classifiers’ undermine claims to humanity. In 
destabilising the ontological credentials of other people, possibilities for moral (i.e. 
legitimate) action are expanded. It becomes a virtue to weed-out ‘elements’ in the 
community who represent a threat to it (however irrationally conceived). Those who 
seek to ‘purify’ or ‘decontaminate’ communities appeal to disgust as the moral 
template upon which their violent actions are based. Some people –disabled people 
- become less than human. Some people – disabled people - become good to 
mistreat. 
 
Purified identity and the expropriation of agency and dignity 
In ‘The Fall of Public Man’, Richard Sennett (2002) traces the rise of the ‘tyranny of 
intimacy’; a process – that began in the 18th century - through which public social 
interaction declines and local, familial space becomes ‘morally sacred’ (2002:295). In 
this context community is emptied of sociability and the vivid experience of others 
that is the complex accompaniment of social interaction. Community becomes 
‘mythic’, ‘a weapon against the outside world’ (Sennett 1996: 5); for it is derived from 
a ‘purified’ sense of similarity; identification with an abstract, generalised other ‘who’ 
has no content garnered from the experience of the mess and volatility of public life. 
Community is replaced by its idealisation; by a desire for belonging conceived as an 
orderly space of comfort and protection that is coherent and unsullied by the 
contaminations of difference. The sphere of public human communication is drained 
of disorder, as seekers of a purified identity abjure all that is vulnerable and abject in 
human relations. 
Sennett implies that social relations in modernity create and sustain a systematic 
pattern of abjectification of difference and hypostatisation of self-reliant agency by 
adhering to a homogenised notion of community and solidarity. What Sennett 
suggests about contemporary urban communities is manifest in many other historical 
instances in which the dynamic of purification is, simultaneously, one of putrefaction. 
Every pedestal creates a gutter; spews out the ‘unworthy’ by expropriating their 
agency and dignity. 
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Social processes of purification posit ideals of human becoming. The ableist doxa of 
embodiment privileges’ normal’ corporeality: yet, it does so grudgingly, for it aspires 
to greater heights; to enhancement and ultimately, to perfection. One can detect the 
aspiration to an unblemished humanity in a variety of cultural contexts; the virtuous 
eudaimon of classical culture; the theomorphic doctrine of imago dei – or man made 
in the image of God – in medieval Christendom; the celebration of the eugene (well-
born) of middle-modernity or the post-human/trans-human phantasies of hyper-
modernity. Each of these aspirations embodies a normate desire for a better 
humanity manifest in the form of a putative utopian corporeality. The pedestal and 
the gutter may mutate across time and place but as polarities of the moral economy 
they are intertwined. 
Table 2: The pedestal and the gutter 
Culture The pedestal The gutter 






Imago dei (image and likeness of 
God) 
Monster/demon 
Middle modernity Eugene (well born) Idiot/cripple 
Postmodernity The trans-human The subhuman 
 
These moral binaries underpin aspirations for some-kind-of-Absolute beyond the 
norm of given social experience, for a Platonic/Hegelian ‘reality’ above and beyond 
crude forms of empirical embodiment: Absolute virtue for the Greeks; glorious, 
angelic resurrection for the Christians; unblemished purity for the Victorians and a 
sci-fi super-humanity for the contemporary period. Utopian notions of life up-scaled 
to a new plane of excellence and achievement have the tendency to reconfigure 
disability as – even more - ontologically problematic, as a threat to the ambitions of 
autonomy, propriety, nobility and the good life; to depict ‘it’ as a putative pollutant in 
the crystal-clear waters of life. Douglas (1966: 48) argues that ‘our pollution 
behaviour is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or 
contradict cherished classification’. It is therefore, ‘a central source of moral order’ 
(ibid: 154); a sort of social ‘anal retentiveness’ that vilifies anything perceived or 
represented as unhygienic.  
Each of the super-hygienic aspirations described in Table 2 above has, buried in its 
cultural core, the repudiation of the unnatural and the irrational, the elimination of all 
manifestations of chaos in psyche and soma, including the disavowal of physical and 
intellectual impairment. The moral economy is not only inflected by the normate or 
ableist influences of everyday lay normativity but also by extravagant ontologies of 
human being enmeshed in fantasies of invulnerability and perfection that embody the 
disavowal of mortality and the dystopian magnification of human capabilities. 
Simultaneously, the moral climate of disavowal and dehumanising actions towards 
people perceived as contaminating is exacerbated. The desire to flee the ‘all too 
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human’; to abrogate abjection and vulnerability in the realisation of an odyssey of 
perfection is indicative of the enduring repulsiveness of corporeal life, le visqueux 
(Sartre 1966). Signs of messy embodiment and dependency evoke the enduring 
threat of mortality; the dread of death and decay that ableist reveries of the pedestal 
seek to conceal. In these fantasies of betterment and perfection the mortal and the 
moral steer a course towards one another; the former eclipsed by the latter.  
As instruments of moral agency (for non-disabled people), disabled people are 
corralled into a network of regulating structures for their own good. This involves a 
double expropriation of core elements of disabled people’s humanity that is derived 
from their designation as vulnerable and abject. To define (or misrecognise) an 
individual as vulnerable suggests an expropriation of their agency and to define (or 
misrecognise) an individual as abject is to expropriate their dignity. If the poor and 
the proletariat are created, as Proudhon argued, by the expropriation of property, 
disability is created by the expropriation of agency; by the transformation of impaired 
people into persons to whom things are and should be done for and/or to. In a 
general theoretical sense, this ‘stripping out’ of the agent from the impaired body is 
fundamental to the cultural subordination, including the disavowal of disability, and 
its ‘othering’ as an identity. It underpins the processes by which the normate 
community can fashion its system of evaluations about self and other; including the 
aggrandisement of individual autonomy and self-reliance that this privileged club 
attributes to its members. Ableism prospers from a moral economy in which disability 
is invalidated; in which disabled people are positioned as incapable of managing 
their own well-being. By contrast the autonomous agent is capable of negotiating the 
traps and pitfalls from which the vulnerable must be safeguarded. The able are able 
to recognise their prospects for flourishing and for, as Aristotle would have it, 
‘realising the good life’. They have the gifts to ascend to the pedestal. Pity goes out 
to those who are not so blessed. Charity, philanthropy and welfare, institutionalise 
the good conduct that follows from the misappropriation of disabled people’s agency. 
Vulnerable people are good to be good to.  
There is a second reason why the pedestal has no room for disability. This has to do 
with its alignment with a range of historically variable tropes that condemn it to or, at 
least, align it with, the gutter. Monstrosity, sin, contamination, crookedness, 
irrationality, leakiness, vengefulness, abnormality … and one could go on ... and on. 
These negative moral evaluations suggest that, at best, disability is a spoiled 
identity, at worst a putrefied form of humanity, an abomination. They have been used 
to conjoin disability and abjection and bring disgust into centre-field in the economy 
of affects that it shapes. The relationship between disabled and non-disabled people 
relies on the expropriation of disabled people’s dignity and simultaneously, the 
approbation of non-disability as a proper way of being-in-the-world. The de-
dignification of disability legitimates the maltreatment and violence that has followed 
disabled people across history, from eugenic infanticide in antiquity, through 
demonization in the Christian middle-ages and institutionalisation during the period 
16 
 
of the ‘great confinement’ to the gas chambers of Hitler’s Germany and the ‘hate 
crimes’ reported by contemporary criminal justice systems. People, dehumanised 
and dispossessed of their dignity are good to mistreat. 
Conclusion 
To place disability in the moral economy is to map-out the dimensions of human 
evaluation in any given social or historical context. These dimensions provide a 
window on the distribution of human worth; the relative validity of groups or persons; 
the qualities that come to be admired or demeaned. This distribution is difficult to plot 
as a continuum. Evaluation in the social world of quotidian phenomenological 
simplifications tends to cohere into binaries of good and bad, right and wrong; 
‘typifications’ that help us to handle complexity by reducing it to manageable 
categories. These moral types do not fall from heaven and cannot be read-off from 
nature. They arise in the welter of social relations from the play of power that gives 
them shape. For disabled people, normate power and the ableism dominate the 
landscape of evaluation 
Disability is caught in a dialectical contradiction of attraction and repulsion, 
compassion and disgust, vulnerability and abjection. I do not understand this 
situation as inevitable, as an essence or an existential universal; a condition of 
always and everywhere. It is rather best understood in terms of ‘social ontology’’; 
positions, or perspectives of the imaginary constructed in particular and concrete 
ways that are relative to time and space, history and culture (Hughes 2007). They 
are strongly related to the age-old issue of how human communities deal with 
questions of mortality and morality; the ways of being in the world that are valued 
and disvalued. The judgements that every society makes about where virtue lies and 
where it does not, sit at the core of the moral social ontology of the day.  
The moral space occupied by disability in the social world is a dialectic that needs to 
be critically unpacked, principally by a historical sociology of disability invalidation 
that works through the impact of the interplay of abjection and vulnerability on 
disabled people’s lives. It must also examine how the vestigial presence of past 
prejudice re-erupts in newly moralised representations of those lives and how this 
dissembling heritage of ableism burdens disabled people, unfairly, with a reputation 
for inaction and unseemly being.  
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